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THE NEXT GREAT STEP IN JURISPRUDENCE
"The law has got to be stated over again, and I venture to say
that in fifty years we shall have it in a form of which no man
could have dreamed fifty years ago."-ustice Holmes, i886.
I.
THE CONDITION OF JURISPRUDENCE.
The ultimate goal of jurisprudence is the production of a uni-
form system of law for a united people in order that all persons
having a common allegiance shall have a common law, simple,
easily understood and readily ascertainable.
The need of a logically co-ordinated system of law, uniform
throughout the United States, so far as conditions and needs are
identical, is now admitted with practical unanimity by all jurists
and statesmen.
The necessity for such a work has been felt in every system of
law and to condense and simplify the law has been the effort of
many law-givers and jurists. Hon. U. M. Rose, lately president
of the American Bar Association, says: "A desire to simplify
the law has fired the ambition of several distinguished rulers.
* * * Casar himself had a scheme of that sort; Justinian and
Napoleon each left an eternal legacy as the result of their efforts
in that direction."
Sir Francis Bacon sought the support of King James, saying:
"Of the laws of England I have com.ended them afore for the
matter, but surely they ask much amendment for the form, which
to reduce and perfect I hold to be the one of the greatest dowries
that can be conferred upon this kingdom."
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Lord Chief Justice Hale's analysis was not the first effort, but
he was the first to display a comprehensive and logical synoptical
outline under which could be arranged every principle and every
rule of English law.
Dr. Wood, in his Institutes, was the first to enlarge this scheme
and to arrange the body of principles and rules under such an
outline. Blackstone's Commentaries carried this attempt on iden-
tical principles and outlines to the extent to which the effort
towards system had gone at the period of the American Revo-
lution.
It should be borne in mind that Blackstone's Commentaries con-
stituted the general visible outline of the English Constitution
and laws, and was so recognized without dissent by all American
publicists, and this, as has been frequently remarked, has been the
real influence, preserving the essential harmony and unity of our
system of law.
The desideratum of the accomplishment of this great design
has not generally been recognized, and for that reason Iegislators
and reformers have been floundering for the last half century
with attempts and with measures which have as a rule, when put
to the practical test in most instances, resulted in still greater con-
fusion. The desideratum has been and is a logical and compre-
hensive plan of classification in accordance with which the various
rules and principles which make up the corpus juris-the body of
the law-with the precedents showing their reason and history
and illustrating their application, can be arranged and stated and
in this manner the whole corpus juris be made to present itself
as a co-ordinated system.
With such a system conflict could not long exist, because two
conflicting rules, even though legally operative in different juris-
dictions, would not long survive direct contrast in immediate
juxtaposition.
Mr. Justice James Wilson was the first American jurist who has
left any public record upon this subject, but, unfortunately, he
left no formal outline and did not state any general principle
upon which he proposed to proceed. He, however, stated that
the arrangement could not be alphabetical and must be
logical and, in va:ious parts of his works, indicates his belief
in the application to our law of the general principles of logical
classification. It is clear that he approved and intended to adopt
the principles of the classical jurists who have followed the main
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outline of the Roman civilians, modifying and changing the visible
outline to conform to the American system of law and govern-
ment.
Bearing in mind that Wilson closed his career, so far as this
subject is concerned, before Washington's administration ended,
we may readily understand that the tendency toward confusion
had not then set in, as it did after the year i8oo, when the people
of the different States began to regard each State as an inde-
pendent sovereignty, but Wilson foresaw the inevitable tendency
and need for a check.
By the year 1820 the condition of affairs began to be serious.
As early as 1823 Nathan Dane said: "A serious evil we are fast
running into in most of our States. This inundation of books
made in different States and nations will increase until we can
shake off more of our local notions. Our true course is plain;
that is, by degrees to make our laws more uniform and national,
especially when there is nothing to make them otherwise but
local feeling and prejudice. We have in the common and federal
law the material for national uniformity in many cases. We
have a national judiciary, promoting this uniformity, and we
have lawyers, learned, industrious and able, to second the judici-
ary. We want only a general, efficient plan, supported with
energy and national feeling."
All will recognize that Dane here states one obstacle which,
until long since the war, could not be overcome. That is, that
local feeling and prejudice, so long as it existed, was an obstacle
which prevented the desire for uniformity while business condi-
tions and transportation facilities were in such a state as to
render the need less imperative than at present.
The other desideratum was one which might be furnished at
any time by any person or body of men capable of such a per-
formance and willing to submit to the years of study and the
drudgery of detail essential to the Creation of a plan which would
be a real induction resulting from a conscientious and careful
study of all the materials involved. At the present day, the needs
essential are (a) a plan comprehensive, logical, practical, (b)
"supported with energy and (c) national feeling."
The element of energy, practically speaking, in plain English,
is simply the financial support which sustains large co-operative
effort.
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Less than four decades ago the people of the United States
became a united nation. Before that time they were so only in
theory and in name. Their unity was a legal fiction, made much
of in prosecuting a common cause against a common enemy,
but ignored on every occasion calling for the seeming self-
sacrifices involved wherever local self-interest was called upon
to yield something to the common good. This was not confined
to any section of the country. During the last half-century,
however, the evolution towards accord and actual harmony has
been constant and has been accelerated with a gathering mo-
mentum by those instrumentalities which have been gradually
a~nnihilating time and distance. As is always the case,, the state-
ment of the law has not kept pace with changes in sentiment
and conditions. On the contrary the rapid development has
fostered confusion. Externally the laws of the various States
seem to present a medley of contradictions, a chaotic assortment
of incongruous ideas, and all our comprehensive books designed
to cover the whole field, are thrown together in utter disregard
of all scientific principles of arrangement and expression.
Intrinsically, the condition is better than the surface indications
show. In the domain of jurisprudence, relating to the nature of
our national organism, the period of bitter controversy has passed.
Here and there may be heard the echo of some ancient dogma;
here and there some political partisan or some cloistered doc-
trinaire still seeks to apply ancient theories to modern conditions
There is still some conflict upon minor points, but, upon the
whole, the fundamental questions of our law are so well settled
and so generally understood as to be ready to yield to the sifting
of science for the purpose of logical organization and exposition.
Mr. Waite states a truth which any one, who will take the pains
to examine our whole body of law, will corroborate: "There is
a remarkable harmony in the general principles of American law.
There are discrepancies and contradictions in some instances, but
notwithstanding these, it may be regarded as settled that there
is a great uniform, settled sstem of American law." (Actions
and Defences, Preface.)
II.
SCIENTIFIC CONSOLIDATION TIE REM1EDY.
The function of practical jurisprudence is to sift out and make
available by visible expression in logical relation what is valuable
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in the accumulated mass of ancient principles, novel doctrines and
modern rules, eliminating those which have become wholly obso-
lete and innocuous; in other words, to keep the actual law know-
able and to guide and.guard the expression of law in its. forma-
tion. This process is now made possible by the judicial and
catholic spirit which is manifest on every hand. It is retarded
by that spirit which is ever present, always the same, and always
maintaining that that which is is the best attainable. The genius 
of
conservatism is always to be overcome. There is an inertia 
in
matters intellectual as well as in matters material. The exponents
of what they call "the conservative view" invariably resort to an
argument which, to them, is all powerful, but which is, in fact,
the weakest ever advanced; that is, that it is impossible to do this
or to do that, and in all cases means no more than that the asserter
himself does not see the way; therefore, there is no way. Every
forward movement in civilization, art, and science, has had to
overcome this same guardian of the intellectual pillars of Hercules,
this same spectre which always stands warning those who would
venture beyond known regions, that further progress is im-
possible, while, in truth, progression is inevitable.
If we extend our reflections, we may see that the struggle 
is a
conflict between the empiricists and the institutionists. 
The
empiricists insist that there is no system; that every phenomenon
is an isolated event, or, at best, that the one branch is a system by
itself and every topic complete in itself. In this manner 
the
empiricist reaches the pinnacle of his aspirations when he achieves
the proud designation of "Specialist."
The institutionists, on the other hand, maintain that juris-
prudence exists; that it is a science, and that its practical applica-
tion will reduce any body of municipal law to a plain, 
simple
system, unembarrassed by the breadth of domain, elaborateness
and minuteness of legislation or the number of rules and prece-
dents. The talisman, the touchstone, the guiding principle in 
this
science, as in every other, is analysis and classification.
Classification is clearly the basis of logical science; classifica-
tion is an essential part of the definition of jurisprudence; classi-
fication is an essential part of the work of codification and of 
sys-
tematic consolidation. It is by means of classification and concise
statement that any complex mass is reduced to system. System
is the creator of simplicity. Falck, a distinguished German
jurist, says:
490 YALE LAW JOURNAL
"Three things are requisite in order that the representation ofthe rules of law recognized in a country may really deserve the
name of a Science. First, the principles of Right and Law mustbe so completely treated, that no jural relation shall remain un-
explained, at least in its essential points. Second, the grounds
upon which the jural truths rest must be convincingly developed.Third, and finally, the arrangement of the whole system must be
carried out, even in its individual parts, according to the principles
of its internal essential connection, and not merely in accordance
with an arbitrarily chosen scheme. The scientific character ofthe system consists in the union of these three qualities: Com-pleteness, Depth or Fundamentalness, and Order."
The solution of our present difficulties depends upon the recog-
nition of a few simple facts and great principles. American lawis an integral system. Its contradictions result from the remnant
of local prejudice and divers conceptions of fundamental theories
and public policies; or, in other words, a confused and indefinite
conception of that body of jurisprudence which, in the nomencla-
ture of the lazu, is spoken of as the Conmon Law. The concep-
tion of this body of rules and principles has become so variant
and confused that it is no longer presented as a rational and
coherent system, and used as the framework of our legal edifice:
It is imperative that the common law be given definite and clear
statement in such a manner that it can be said that there is abody of unwritten principles and rules common throughout the
whole country with reference to which all other law is construed.
Judge Dillon expresses the thought:
"The forecast may be ventured that while the law will, in itsdevelopment, undoubtedly keep pace with the changing wants ofsociety, yet the work of jurists and legislators during the next
century will be pre-eminently the work of systematic restatement
of the body of our jurisprudence. Call it a code, or what youwill, this work must be done. If not dofhe from choice, the in-exorable logic of necessity will compel its performance." * * *This work, as important, as noble as ant' that can engage the
attention of men. will fall to. the profession to do, since it can-
not be done by others. It rests, therefore, upon the profession
as a duty. It will not be performed by men whose sun, like mine,has passed the ,renith, and whose faces are already turned to fol-
low its setting."
When this is accomplished we will possess what our ancestors
practically had when they could refer to one system of rules ex-
pounded by a single system of courts as of some selected date.
L Law & Jur., 386-7.
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The common law is now as variant as the varied talents and
learning of a great variety of judges; like the old idea of equity,
it is "all one with the Chancellor's foot."
It should not be overlooked that the statutory adoption of the
English common law always designates some date or period.
Once the common law is again reduced to a rational and uni-
form system, so expressed and so generally acquiesced in that
we can fairly say that we have a definite common law, the uni-
formity of the statute law will follow as a consequence. Until
there is a common understanding of the common law, the identical
words of statutory enactment mean the same or different things
according to the judicial conception of the common law. A
careful study of the matter will convince most men that this is
the rock upon which the attempts at the codification of the law
or parts of the law have broken, for let it be understood that in
codification the principles which constitute the reason of the law
are not expressed; they are implied as part of the common law.
The precedents which illustrate the application of the rules are
not indicated, whereas the meaning of the statute in all cases
depends upon the conception of these two elements, and so a
code is never, even to its framers, complete in itself.
The body of our law is not so vast as many are led to suppose
by reason of the seeming vastness of the written fecords in which
it is enveloped. The vast and widely scattered material embraces
a comparatively small body of rules and principles capable of
being. brought into clear light and stated in a reasonable compass.
Many persons suppose that we have a variety of law, correspond-
ing with the number of jurisdictions applying it. That is, that
we have fifty systems of law. But all those are equivalent sys-
tems, in outline identical and in the main substantively alike.
Truly, we have some divergence of construction, interpretation
and application, but, on a given point, proposition or rule, there
is, in most cases, uniformity, and it is very seldom that there
exist more than two conflicting rules upon an identical proposi-
tion.
Occasionally there is an idiosyncrasy of doctrine which might
be classed as an anomalous rule, but exposing these to contrast
in juxtaposition soon draws them together, and many jurists have
remarked upon the tendency of the present generation to uni-
formity and the growing habit of acquiescing in the decision of
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the Supreme Court of the United States on rules of general appli-
cation.
Our endeavor should be to reduce the heterogeneous mass to
an organized system, exorcising the obsolete rules, bringing con-
flicting precedents into sharp contrast in order that the more
reasonable rules shall ultimately prevail. Systematic consolida-
tion is the means. The end desired is to establish uniformity
in law (that is, one rule applicable to the same conditions every-
where), clearness in expression and this within reasonable com-
pass, with an arrangement rendering everything readily accessible.
InI.
THE ACTUAL LAW MUST BE DISENTANGLED FROM THE OBSOLETE
MATTER.
By our system of reporting, the mass of decisions called prece-
dents, beginning with the year books, is preserved with religious
care and, until recently, was regarded with blind veneration. In
recent years it has become apparent that, because of the divergen-
cies and contradictions, precedents cannot any longer be relied
upon unless they are at the same time in conformity with some
established, recognized principle. Changes in business condi-
tions or public policy render a constantly increasing proportion
of this mass obsolete, overruled and entirely useless until, at the
present time, by far the largest part of the entire mass is
obsolete and of mere historic interest. Of the American cases,
it is safe to say that the greatest part are already overruled or
modified or their analogy is destroyed by changes in conditions.
These observations indicate that whoever attempts to know or
to express our law must not attempt to restate the whole mass of
rules to be found in our reports and which, at various times, has
been the law.
Actual law is the quest of the courts and the lawyers, for it is
the actual law which rules. This actual law lies imbedded in a
vast conglomerate of precedents and, like the golden nuggets of
the mine, is concealed by the refuse accumulated by the surge and
grind of shifting civilization.
The practical side of the science of law is to keep the actual
law in plain view and easy of access. The actual law should be
extracted from the mass and given exclusive place in the main
text of the books of the law. Jurisprudence will commend itself
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to the rank and file when and to the degree that it performs this
service. The task which lies before the present generation is to
provide the system whereby the actual law can. be separated from
the obsolete and placed in the foreground.
IV.
LOGICAL CLASSIFICATION AND CONDENSATION REQUIRED.
Accessibility of any part of a large mass requires separation
and arrangement; that is, classification. The creation of a system
by classification is the solution-but what system, and how is it
to be created? Obviously, the one most adapted to simplicity,
compactness and completeness. The alphabetical arrangement has
been tried. It is still being used and is making its inadequacy
palpable. Every jurist of note, who has given serious attention.
to this subject, has declared that the solution depends upon a
logical system of classification under which to arrange the body
of principles, rules and precedents. It cannot be too much em-
phasized that alphabetical arrangement is not classification, but
is the very opposite. It is a mere method, without a principle; it
is the veriest empiricism; it allows orthography to dominate logic;
it segregates integral subjects; it obscures the relations of things;
it renders a system impossible; it has rendered our law chaotic; it
has almost eradicated jurisprudence.
Professor Holland says:
"It may be safely said that no code or digest from the Code
Theodosian to the Code Civil of Lower Canada has, as yet, been
tolerably well arranged. Not one shows any conception of the
mutual relation of the great departments of law; not one is
governed by the logical principle of dichotomy, which, 
though it
may not be always visible, yet should underlie and determine the
main features of any system of classification."
Jurists andl statesmen are awakening to the proposition that the
key to this difficult situation is something outside of the positive
law itself-a something over and above law, namely, the processes
of jurisprudence and the special process known as classification.
This may be shown by the following quotations, to which many
similar ones could be added.
Judge Dillon writes:
"The present want of our substantive law is an authoritative,
scientific and comprehensive arrangement of its vast and scat-
tered materials-a work which is yet in its formative stages.
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What has thus far been projected has made but little real advance
and has not always proceeded on the right plan or principles.
Our laws and jurisprudences must be analyzed and resolved into
their constituent principles and these must be arranged according
to their own nature. The resulting arrangement will, necessarily,
be as unique and distinctive as the materials with which it deals.
It cannot be recast except to a limited extent, in moulds furnished
by the civil or continental law."
Professor Sheldon Amos, in his discourse, An English Code,
writes:
"The conception of a proper system is that of placing into a
scientific framework every part of the law, whether common or
statute, until the result is that every legal rule is somewhere
embraced in the form bf a legal proposition. In the process of
constructing such a system-whether it be called a code or a
compendium, the arrangement of the whole must precede the
parts. * * * When the Conception of the Whole has been oncefully grasped and adequately expressed, the careful elaboration
of the several parts will involve much of the very same process
of digesting by a number of hands which, prior to a scheme of
the whole being resolved upon and mapped out, is so much waste
toil. Mr. Austin, almost translating Thibaut, says: 'The project
must be the work of one. The general outline, the work of one
might be filled up by divers.' * * * It is assumed by the ablest
advocates of codification that some basis of theoretical classifica-
tion is the basis of codification."
The opinion of one of our most practical jurists has peculiar
weight from the fact of his wide and varied theoretical study and
practical experience, and from the further fact that he assisted in
the creation of the alphabetical arrangement now in use in digests
and encyclopedias. The late Austin Abbott, shortly before his
death, wrote:
"One of the chief defects in legal writings and compilations at
the present day is imperfect classification. The immense multi-plicity of authorities requires thorough analysis and classification,
lest we be lost in a labyrinth of contrasts. Imperfect classifica-
tion is not merely a defect in the results of research-it is ahindrance in the process of research."
V.
JURISPRUDENCE MUST BE PUT TO PRACTICAL USES.
In the domain of law it is plain that the point has been reached
where, in order that there be a real comprehension, the multitude
of axioms, decisions, constitutions, statutes and customs which
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make up the body of written and unwritten law must be sub-
jected to scientific treatment and exposition.
Holland, on the first page of his work on Jurisprudence, says:
"The difficulty of the subject is due less to the multiplicity of
its details than to the absence of general principles under which
these details can be grouped. In other words, while legal science
is capable of being intelligently learned, isolated facts are capable
of being only committed to memory."
In order, then, that this domain be treated by a scientific method,
it is necessary, first, to create or discover some scientific system
of investigation and exposition. In other words, we must dis-
cover what that science we call Jurisprudence really is, and how
ve must go about applying it in order to attain the practical end
of reducing the corpus juris to a simple, clear and comparatively
concise system of rules and principles.
Jurisprudence may safely be affirmed to be a logical science,
having for one of its principal functions the arrangement or
classification and statement of the principles, doctrines and rules
of law, i. e., the creation of a visible corpus juris.
Historical jurisprudence is sometimes spoken of, but obviously
such an expression as "historical jurisprudence" means no more
than historical invcstigation, having -for its object the ascertain-
ment of facts. Jurisprudence, properly so called, involves two
processes, analysis and synthesis; these are the elements of classi-
fication and no modern definition can be found which does not
involve, as the central element and process, the logical process of
classification.
This contrast between historical investigation and scientific ex-
position is quite clearly indicated by Justice Holmes in an address
before the Boston University Law School. He says:
"Perhaps I have said enough to show the part which the study
of history necessarily plays in the intelligent study of the law
as it is to-day. In the teaching at this school and at Cambridge,
it is in no danger of being undervalued. In England the recent
History of Early English Law, by Sir Frederick Pollock and Mr.
Maitland, has lent the subject an almost deceptive charm. We
must beware of the pitfall of antiquarianism and must remember
that, for our purposes, our only interest in the past is for the
light it throws on the present. I look forward to the time when
the part played by history in the explanation of dogna shall be
very small and, instead of ingenious research, we shall spend our
energy on a study of the end sought to be obtained and the rea-
sons for desiring it. * * * There is another study which
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sometimes is undervalued by the practical minded for which I
wish to say a good word. I mean the study of what is called
Jurisprudence. Jurisprudence, as I look at it, is simply law in its
most generalized part. Every effort to reduce a case to a rule
is an effort of jurisprudence. Theory is the most important part
of the dogma of the law, as the architect is the most important
man who takes part in the building of a house. The most import-
ant improvements of the last twenty-five years are improvements
in theory. It is not to be feared as impracticable, for, to the
competent, it simply means going to the bottom of the subject."
VI.
WHY CODIFICATION HAS FAILED.
A consideration of the reasons for the failure of attempts at
codification hitherto made will enable us to bring more clearly
into light the principles which must govern in the next great step
which, whether we will or not, inevitably must be taken.
Bentham and Austin inaugurated, in apparently different fields,
movements in the direction of the establishment of an orderly
system of law, intended to be complete and simple. They ac-
complished what may have seemed to themselves very little, and
they passed from the field of their activity, leaving it apparently
little affected by their efforts. Bentham and Austin labored in
the same field but in different ways. Neither was entirely right
and neither was fully equipped for the accomplishment of his
purpose. Bentham's main design was essentially chimerical and,
yet, his efforts have done much for the cause of law reform.
Austin's leading conceptions were, in the main, essentially cor-
rect and the indirect result of his labors has been very great.
John Austin had the misfortune to be judged by a half-done
task. The lack of physical strength prevented him from exhaust-
ing the materials of the two great fields essential to investigation;
namely, the field of metaphysical, i. e., logical, jurisprudence and
the field of practical, existing law. The cause of failure--or,
rather, the lack of complete success, of both Bentham and Austin
was not the infusion of too many ideas imbibed from the sources
of civil and continental jurisprudence, but the exclusion of
essential principles of English law not to be put aside for the
idea of codification, even under the specious name of law reform.
The case of Mr. David Dudley Field, and his attempt to impose
codification upon American jurisprudence, is quite different. His
defeat 'in many contests in that forum, as well as the failure in
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the practical operation of the codes he caused to be adopted, is
due to other causes. These are, first, a lack of attention to the
essential principles which must be observed in planning a code
or any elaborate system by means of which to express the law;
for it should always be remembered the main object of codifica-
tion or of any exposition desirable at the present day is not the
ittjention of new law, but better expression of that which exists.
It comports better with the deference which should be paid to
this truly great man to have these reasons expressed by another,
and that other himself an advocate of codification.
Sheldon Amos, in his book, An English Code, thus states
these reasons:
"In the first place, the principle of preparing the whole code at
once and from a single point of view, so as to insure harmony
of plan and unswerving consistency in the use of terms, was vio-
lated at the outset. The conception of the code entertained by
the commissioners was not a scientific system, compelling all the
heterogeneous element of existing law to enter into compartments
judicially mapped out, but a republication of the statute and
common law on such principles of classification as might do as
little violence as possible to the methods and language adopted
in the common text books. The difference in fact between tkese
two conceptions is unspeakably wide. * * * The general faults
of the New York 'Civil Code' are such as might have been
anticipated from the imperfect conception of a code."
"Apart from occasional scraps of terminology and arrangement
borrowed from Justinian's Institutes and the Code Napoleon, the
whole work reproduces, in an utterly undigested form, the notions
and the very phraseology in which the English law is clothed in
the most hastily compiled text books."
"If a code purports to be an exact reproduction, in a systematic
form, of an actual system of law, it is some disparagement to
that code if it affixes new meanings to terms, or amplifies old
meanings, in a way wholly alien to the common language of the
law presumable codified."
"The utter unserviceableness of the whole class of definitions
on which that of property rests is transparent at every point."
"The language, on so essential a matter as this (contract) is
simply inconsistent with itself, and vacillates between the loose
style of popular dialogue and the somewhat stricter phraseology
of common text books."
"The above faults and shortcomings in the New York Code
have been pointed out simply in order to guard the English
public and the legal profession against the temptation to con-
struct, under a sudden impulse, a worthless code."
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It will be observed that none of these criticisms militate against
codification. The inherent fault of codification, as applied to
English and American law, lies in another direction; it has been
so often stated that it needs but a summary of the positions:
Codes are always but partial statements of the law. The com-
mon law is never stated but is assumed to inhere in the language
used and to exist unexpressed, and consequently modifies the
application. The body of principles is never expressed. The
precedents throwing light on the language used are not made
accessible.
LOGICAL CLASSIFICATION, NOT LEGISLATIVE CODIFICATION, IS RE-
QUIRED.
It does not follow because a reform which has in it an alien
principle is rejected, that the good and adaptable priniciples should
be also rejected. The one essential principle of codification and
of Austin's philosophy is classification. Of its principles Bentham
knew little, while Austin knew much; he had drunk deep at the
spring of that philosophy established by Aristotle, and deepened
and widened by modern scholars and which being applied to the
law by the great philosophical jurists constitutes jurisprudence.
Bentham advocated something which Englishmen and Amer-
icans do not want. Austin accomplished much toward perfecting
the first great step in the great movement of setting law in order,
which English and American law must have.
VII.
TIE FUNDAMENTAL FACT.
Austin's great achievement was not the first step in juris-
prudence; that had been taken centuries before him and, in his
own country, had been followed in a practical way by Hale, Wood,
Blackstone and others. His great achievement was the making
plainer than had ever been done before that there is a universal
jurisprudence to which all systems of law must needs tacitly
conform.
As Amos points out, the utility of this conception once under-
stood and acted upon cannot be exaggerated.
Professor Amos says:
"There are few students of English law who are unaware that
the most finished and characteristic portion of the works of the
late Mr. Austin is occupied with ascertaining the limits of the
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province of jurisprudence. It is not easy to exaggerate the im-
portance of the task itself, and it would be superfluous to dwell
upon the acuteness and laboriousness with which it was carried
out-however imperfect as a vehicle of the author's total thoughts
was the practical shape which his speculations chanced to take.
Mr. Austin established once for all, as has been already intimated,
with a decisive clearness which none-of his rivals in this or any
other country have equalled, that in all systems of law-to what-
ever period or form of civilization they may belong-there are
certain definite and lasting conceptions, the constant reappearance
of which can ever assuredly be counted upon, and which are
capable of being expressed in the terms of an universal lma-
guage."2
This was not unknown to others. Judge Dillon quotes Sir
William Jones as follows:
"The student of the law will constantly observe a striking UNI-
FORMITY AMONG ALL NATIONS, whatever seas or mountains may
separate them, or how many ages soever may have elapsed be-
tween the periods of their existence. IN THOSE GREAT AND FUNDA-
MENTAL PRINCIPLES, which, being clearly deduced from natural
reason, are equally diffused over all mankind, and are not subject
to alteration by any change of place or time."3
John Austin made the matter plainer and indicated its logical
connection with a natural classification. Jurists are now able,
because of the increased facility for observing all the various
forms of civilization, to make the induction that, irrespective of
the varying forms of government and the differing details of the
various departments of law, as they exist in different countries,
they all present a uniform outline almost as distinct and almost
as similar as the skeletons of the various races.
There are in all nations the family relations, the relations of
government and people, the regulations of property, the system
of remedial justice, and the code of criminal punishments. To
restate these ideas-there is, in the jurisprudence of all civilized
nations:
First, those fundamental regulations which constitute the people
a political society, and regulate the governmental relations:
Second, the law governing family relations and the rules inci-
dent thereto;
Third, the regulations governing the acquisition and trans-
mission of property;
Fourth, the system of remedial justice; and,
2 An English Code, p. 205.
s Law & Jurisprudence, p. 137.
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Fifth, the code of criminal law by which the public restrains
and punishes.
Without stopping to explain or argue, it is safe to affirm that
all these fell naturally--that is, logically-under the: formula
worked out by the Greek and Roman philosophers, which we find
stated by Gaius, that "all our law relates to Persons, Things and
Actions," and that all subdivisions of the law subordinate to the
five primary divisions first above stated take their places without
conflict and without repetition under the subdivision in accord-
ance with a single fundamental principle.
Austin's achievement never reached the extent of his obvious
design, and modern jurisprudence has not progressed in the
practical application of theoretical jurisprudence much beyond the
models which existed before Austin's theories were made public.
That is, it may be said of both Austin and Bentham that their
attempts never reached the stage of practically applied juris-
prudence. The reason is obvious, and we have that reason pointed
out by one who, having passed through the stages of theoretical
jurisprudence, now occupies a place in the highest judicial
tribunal of the land.
Mr. Justice Holmes, in an article in The Harvard Law Review,
says:
"Sir James Stephen is. not the only writer whose attempts to
analyze legal ideas have been confused by striving for a useless
quintessence of all systems instead of an accurate anatomy of one.
The trouble with Austin was that he did not know enough English
law."
But this master is quick to add that theory is the most import-
ant part of the dogma of the law, as the architect is the most
important man who takes part in the building of a house, and it
is to be said for Austin that he perhaps realized as clearly as any
that he was but taking the first great step and that before practical
results could be shown it was necessary to subject the actually
existing specific body of English law to just such a process as
Judge Dillon indicates, where he says, "Our laws must be
analyzed and resolved into their constituent principles and these
must be arranged according to their own nature," and, as Amos
adds, "placing all these into a scientific framework until the
result is that every legal rule is somewhere embraced in the form
of a legal proposition."
This, as above indicated, Professor Austin never lived to do.
But who can doubt that, had his health and strength permitted,
he would have attempted it?
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VIII.
THE MANNER OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.
The next great step in jurisprudence is the practical application
of scientific principles to our specific system of American law.
Our task is to display an accurate anatomy of American law, ex-
tending it even to minute details.
Theoretical learning, such as Austin displayed, while absolutely
essential, is not enough. In addition to that scientific and theo-
retical knowledge, whoever attempts to construct a practical
scheme of classification must become a master of the detail rules
in every branch of law. Whatever principles of classification are
made use of, the visible synoptical outline of classification must
conform to the internal conditions of our American system of law.
The conclusion from all this is that the general outline must
be a result--i. e., an induction--drawn from the detailed examina-
tion of typical elements of every part of our law, viewed and
considered in the light of the principles of classification made use
of. No scheme of theoretical classification drawn up in advance
of this detailed examination can be anything more than an experi-
ment. An attempt to enter upon the detail work of compiling
and arranging the specific rules, principles and precedents in ad-
vance, of the carefully worked out, comprehensive plan of
classification can amount to no more than mere empiricism.
With the plan of classification worked out by the writer of this
article, explained in the report on "Classification of the Law,"
before the American Bar Association,4 the practical application
of which is illustrated ia his commentary on American Law,5 the
problem presented by this enterprise is not one yet wholly to be
solved, and the project is something more than a mere hope that
someone will arise to produce a plan suitable for so great an
undertaking.
It may be stated that, in the course of the twenty years during
which that plan and its illustration was under construction, every
known plan was carefully considered, and the result is believed
to accord with the great principles of classification adapted to our
institutions and our law.
Not that the author of this plan of classification, nor any of
those cooperating with him, would indulge the hope that the plan is
4See Am. Bar. Assn. Rept., Vol. 25, PP. 425-475 [1902].
5First Ed., I9oo; 2nd Ed., i9o8. See Review, 2nd Ed. Green Bag,
Vol. XXI, pp. 104-110.
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perfect, or would assume to impose it upon the body of men who
could be asked to co-operate in creating the larger work, but that
it serves as a starting point; a visible example, with which other
systems can be contrasted and which, with the advice, assistance
and effort of the jurists, may be fashioned into a logical, practical,
working plan.
Intelligent, systematic, practical work upon so stupendous a
task and involving such a vast mass of material requires some-
thing more than merely a plan, however perfect that may be. The
practical working out of this great enterprise requires that system
shall govern every process involved.
There are conceived to be the following different processes,
every one of which must be governed by a logical system, carefully
worked out:
First-The system of classification above spoken of, giving
order, showing the relative connection of subjects, avoiding repe-
titions, assuring completeness, clearness and conciseness.
Second-A system of research, aiding in collecting the ma-
terials, ensuring the possession of the actual law, avoiding the
insertion of obsolete rules.
Third-A system of examining cases, ensuring the citation of
cases in point and materially reducing the bulk of ordinary cita-
tion.
Fourth-A system of citation, facilitating historical research,
ensuring exhaustive citation of cases which now rule the courts,
and enabling the persons using the books to refer to all the cases,
from the earliest times.
Fifth-A system of constructing the text, focussing all the law
upon every proposition.
Such a system, applied throughout the whole work, will render
our whole law quickly accessible to anyone.
IX.
A MORE COMPLETE TREATMENT CAN BE GIVEN IN TWENTY VOLUMES
THAN IS NOW GIVEN IN FORTY:
Provided, the text is devoted entirely to law; no text space is
wasted by padding it with obsolete rules; the citation is .not pad-
ded with a mass of cases, supporting elemntary rules; repetition is
carefully avoided by the plan; the citation is of cases in point
where the question was actually involved and really decided.
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That such a hope is quite reasonable is shown by the view of
so practical a legal scholar as the late Austin Abbott, who writes:
"The current legal language, as used, is as clumsy and burden-
some as are the plows and harrows of two centuries ago compared
to the implements of to-day. A thorough master of the English
language could put three or four pages into one; could express
all the ideas of several paragraphs in as many sentences; and by
this condensation, contradictions would be brought into contrast,
inconsistencies exposed and the distinction between settled law
and debatable questions forced upon the attention."
X.
THE ONLY REMAINING OBSTACLE.
At this point we encounter the only real obstacle which lies in
the way of this great movement.
Individual effort, be it never so capable; and the plan, how-
ever comprehensive, simple and scientific, cannot accomplish so
great a task. Power is as important as the capacity and the plan.
Constructive genius and the efficient plan must have the support
of dynamic energy and national feeling.
Reason and the examples of history teach us that a great work
of the character indicated, which will constitute for the American
people an edifice similar to that erected by Tribonian and his
associates, requires co-operation and support similar to that which
Justinian furnished. This financial support constitutes the
dynamic energy. The plan is as important as the power. Na-
poleon never compiled a code. Napoleon supplied the "energy
and national feeling." Aristotle could not have accomplished his
great work without the support furnished by his patron, Alex-
ander the Great. Alexander, with his vast resources, and
Aristotle, with his "constructive genius and organized body of
scholars," created the first great university of the world, wherein
the master minds laid the foundation of modern learning and
civilization. Indeed, the excellence of the Roman law rests
largely upon its connection with this Grecian philosophy. The
power is as important as the plan. BOTH ARE ESSENTIAL.
Judge Rose says:
"Writing more than fifty years ago, Mr. Spence said, 'What
may be effected when some modern Tribonian shall appear with
the capacity and power of compiling the now almost countless
volumes of law into a rational and uniform system of juris-
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prudence, unfettered by merely casual and technical principles, it
would be idle at present even to hazard a conjecture. "
And of course, all such expressions about one man doing such a
task is never true to the fact. Co-operation is essential.
It takes no great faculty to predict what such a man, or any
efficient body of men, would accomplish. It is perfectly clear that,
without. sufficient financial support, they must fail in the full
realization of the hope of accomplishing any such grand concep-
tion. Individual effort can create a commentary, but cannot con-'
struct a full and complete statement of the. Corpus Juris. Co-
operation in some form is essential, and this must be provided in
the only practical way. The work cannot be and should not be
regarded as the work of one man, nor should any one man assume
to dominate any part of it.
The finished product must be fashioned in accordance with the
strictest logic, constructed out of the material which has life and
vital existence, tried by experience and perfected by the criticism
of the master minds of the profession. This work, thus per-
formed, will, in the language of Lord Bacon, constitute "one of
the greatest dowries that can be conferred upon this nation."
Such a work will of necessity exert a great and lasting influence
upon the civilization of the world. It is said by The Independent,
in its issue of March 3, 1910:
"The success of the project is contingent upon the establish-
ment of the suggested foundation for the advancement of juris-
prudence. Here is an opportunity which should satisfy the
highest kind of altruism. Greater service can hardly be rendered
to our nation or to civilization." While a foundation is, no doubt,
the ideal method of support, other practical methods are obvious.
The work is clearly one of national importance and is deserving
of the active cooperation of the legal profession in its creation and
the hearty support of all with energy and natural feeling.
James De Witt Andrews.
New York City.
